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NOTE




The United States prescription drug shortage crisis is a serious and
preventable problem. Numerous reasons have been suggested as
potential causes of the crisis; however, none are wholly satisfactory.
This Note attempts to address the drug shortage crisis by arguing that
the contracting practices of Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs)
create decreased pharmaceutical manufacturer diversity and a fragile
supply chain. GPOs were formed with the purpose of consolidating
buyer power for hospitals to secure the best possible prices for medical
supplies, including prescription drugs, and the lowest possible cost for
hospital patients. However, GPOs have strayed from this purpose,
engaging in contracting practices that increase their profits at the
expense of hospital patients and generic drug manufacturers. The
contracting practices used by GPOs would be illegal under usual
antitrust and fraud law, but GPOs enjoy several unique safe harbors
that immunize them from prosecution. Eliminating the anticompetitive
effect of GPOs will require significant reforms by both the executive
and legislative branches. Repealing the safe harbors protecting GPOs
from antitrust scrutiny will increase manufacturer diversity and lower
manufacturer entry barriers. This will create a more robust healthcare
supply chain capable of rapidly shifting production to meet demand in
the face ofpotential shortages.
* Christian DeRoo is a third year law student at American University, Washington
College of Law. He first became interested in pharmaceutical law when he spent two
years working as a paralegal in Boston, Massachusetts. While in Boston, his work
primarily consisted of negotiating contracts between physicians and pharmaceutical
companies. Christian continued his education in health law by working several
summers for a physician's group defending doctors from malpractice claims. Moving
forward, Christian plans to continue working in the field of health and pharmaceutical
law.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States is undergoing a critical shortage of certain prescription
drugs. Although the impact of the shortage is undeniable, the cause of the
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shortage remains an issue of considerable debate.' Commentators often
point to manufacturing and production problems as the cause of the
shortage.2 This Note, however, argues that insufficient production capacity
is a symptom, not the cause, of the problem. Policy positions taken by
antitrust enforcement agencies and legislation legalizing certain types of
kickbacks as "administrative fees" have exacerbated the problem. Group
Purchasing Organizations ("GPOs") have been granted free reign to legally
engage in anticompetitive practices that depress pharmaceutical production
capacity for certain drugs, creating shortages.
Part II of this Note provides background information explaining how
GPOs contribute to the drug shortage crisis. Part II examines the drug
shortage crisis generally, the role of GPOs in health care, the federal
antitrust agencies governing GPOs, and the application of the Federal Anti-
Kickback Statute to GPOs. Part III analyzes how federal policies and
practices have allowed for, and in some cases, even encouraged,
anticompetitive behaviors by GPOs. Part III begins by applying a
traditional antitrust analysis to GPO practices. Part III then examines the
safe-harbor provision of the Federal Anti-Kickback statute3 ("Safe-Harbor
Provision"), as it relates to GPOs.
Part III argues that without the special protections afforded by the Safe-
Harbor Provision, the "administrative fee" system under which GPOs
operate would constitute fraud. Part III concludes by arguing that current
practices lead to anticompetitive behaviors that raise entry barriers for drug
and medical device manufacturers and increases certain generic drug costs.
Part IV recommends that the executive and legislative branches of the
1. See The Causes of Drug Shortages and Proposals for Repairing These
Markets: Testimony Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform (Nov. 29,
2011) (testimony of Scott Gottlieb), available at http://www.aei.org/speech/health/healt
hcare-reform/the-causes-of-drug-shortages-and-proposals-for-repairing-these-markets/
(arguing that the drug shortage crisis is due to various regulatory factors). But see
Roxanne Nelson, GPOs to Blame For Drug Shortages, Says Physicians Group,
MEDSCAPE TODAY (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/778146
(discussing allegations before Congress that GPOs are a major factor in promoting the
drug shortage crisis); Akiv Roy, How Margaret Hamburg's FDA Causes Cancer Drug
Shortages, FORBES (June 15, 2012, 12:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/
2012/06/15/how-margaret-hamburgs-fda-causes-cancer-drug-shortages/ (arguing that
the drug shortage crisis is a result of FDA enforcement policies undertaken by
Commissioner Margaret Hamburg).
2. See Doug Schoen, The Drug Shortages Crisis in America, FORBES (Feb. 13,
2012, 1:08 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougschoen/2012/02/13/the-drug-
shortage-crisis-in-america/ (noting that while the FDA considers the cause of shortages
to be manufacturing problems, other arguments include small profit margins for
manufacturers, generic manufacturer consolidation, and ingredient shortages).
3. Id.
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federal government reassess their policies to provide for stricter
enforcement against anticompetitive behaviors by GPOs.
I. THE DRUG SHORTAGE CRISIS AND THE ROLE GPO's PLAY
The drug shortage crisis affects millions of Americans each day, whether
in the form of substituted medications, delayed procedures, or higher costs.
The role GPOs play in contributing to the shortage may not seem readily
apparent, but the impact is fundamental-an underlying force which drives
down manufacturing capacity and leads to shortages. Federal regulation
via administrative agencies and congressional legislation has contributed to
this problem by creating safe harbors that shelter anticompetitive practices
by GPOs.
A. Drug Shortages Occur Because Only a Few Key Manufacturers
Produce Certain Drugs, Leading to a Fragile Supply Chain
The first instance of serious drug shortages in the United States occurred
in 1999, and the problem has grown substantially since that time.4 In 2011,
the crisis peaked, with the United States suffering a record 251 drug
shortages. Since 2011, the numbers have diminished slightly, but the
problem remains serious. The Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
reported over 100 ongoing drug shortages as of December 2013.6 Certain
classes of drugs are more susceptible to shortages than others.' The
majority of serious drug shortages occur in the market for sterile injectable
drugs, which account for approximately eighty percent of such shortages.
4. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A REVIEW OF FDA's APPROACH TO MEDICAL
PRODUCT SHORTAGES 3 (Oct. 31, 2011) [hereinafter APPROACH TO MEDICAL PRODUCT
SHORTAGES], available at www.fda.gov/DrugShortageReport (explaining that the
number of drug shortages in the United States tripled from 61 in 2005 to 178 in 2010).
5. See Katie Thomas, Drug Shortages Persist in U.S., Harming Care, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/17/business/drug-shortages-are-
becoming-persistent-in-us.html.
6. See Current Drug Shortages Index, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/DrugShortages/ucm050792.htm (last updated
Dec. 2, 2013).
7. See C. Lee Ventola, The Drug Shortage Crisis in the United States: Causes,
Impact, and Management Strategies, 36 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 740, 749 (2011)
(reporting that certain classes of drugs, especially sterile injectables, are at a high risk
for shortages); see also APPROACH TO MEDICAL PRODUCT SHORTAGES, supra note 4
(stating that in 2010-11, oncology drugs made up 28% of shortages, antibiotics 13%,
and nutrition/electrolyte drugs 11%).
8. See APPROACH TO MEDICAL PRODUCT SHORTAGES, supra note 4; KEvIN
HANINGER, AMBER JESSUP, & KATHLEEN KOEHLER, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF DRUG SHORTAGES (Oct. 2011)
[hereafter HHS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS], available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2011/
drugshortages/ib.shtml (declaring that, in 2010, 74% of shortages involved sterile
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The most common major therapeutic classes of drugs in shortage are
oncology drugs, antibiotics, and electrolyte/nutrition drugs.9 There have
also been noticeable shortages in certain pain medications and anesthesia
agents. 10
There is no shortage of theories as to the cause of the drug shortage
crisis.11 Both the United States Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") and the FDA have suggested a variety of causes as factors leading
to the drug shortage crises; however, their analyses have largely focused on
issues relating to manufacturing and shipping. 12 Although manufacturing
and shipping problems can harm drug supply, the shortages caused by
manufacturing and shipping issues are the symptom of a greater underlying
problem: an unstable supply chain for certain types of drugs and medical
devices.13 A stable supply chain is a major protection against shortages,
and stability is promoted by having a large and diverse group of
suppliers.14  However, only a few manufacturers produce the bulk of
generic drugs, making generics particularly susceptible to shortages.'
injectable drugs, and the majority of shortages for sterile injectables was concentrated
in the generics industry).
9. See APPROACH TO MEDICAL PRODUCT SHORTAGES, supra note 4.
10. See Sharona Hoffman, The Drugs Stop Here: A Public Health Framework to
Address the Drug Shortage Crisis, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 3 (2012) (noting that the
drug shortage crisis has raised concerns from commentators of an "alarming dearth" of
some chemotherapy drugs in recent years, as well as concerns regarding shortages in
heart drugs, pain medications, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder therapies, and
anesthesia agents).
11. See id. at 4-8 (discussing the various factors that commentators have pointed to
as the cause of the drug shortage crisis).
12. See APPROACH TO MEDICAL PRODUCT SHORTAGES, supra note 4, at 15-16
(proposing various reasons for drug shortages, including causes such as manufacturing
issues, labeling mistakes, increased demand, and poor business decisions); HHS
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 1 (indicating that interruptions to manufacturing
are the primary culprit of drug shortages); see also Frequently Asked Questions About
Drug Shortages, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/
DrugShortages/ucm050796.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (stating that the major
reasons for drug shortages are quality/manufacturing issues).
13. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-12-116, DRUG SHORTAGES: FDA's
ABILITY TO RESPOND SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 7 (2011), available at
http://www.gao.gov /assets/590/587000.pdf.
14. See DIANA L. Moss, THE AM. ANTITRUST INST., HEALTHCARE INTERMEDIARIES:
COMPETITION AND HEALTHCARE POLICY AT LOGGERHEADS? 6 (2012),
available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/-antitrust/sites/default/files/AAI%2OWhit
e%20Paper/o20Healthcare%20Intermediaries.pdf (indicating that supply chains with
only a few competitors are at high risk for collapse following any unexpected
disruption).
15. See Ventola, supra note 7 (declaring that most drug shortages affect generic
medications and that most generic drugs are produced by only a few manufacturers);
see also HHS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 6 (reporting that only seven
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B. GPOs are Upstream Purchasing Agents that Engage in Conduct That
Raises Antitrust Concerns
GPOs are economic intermediaries originally established by hospitals to
pool their purchasing power for more favorable contracts with medical
suppliers. 16 Legislatively, a GPO is defined as "an entity authorized to act
as a purchasing agent for a group of individuals or entities who are
furnishing services for which payment may be made under a federal
healthcare program."17 By purchasing as a group, hospitals can achieve
greater discounts and lower prices than they could achieve by bargaining
independently, while also minimizing transaction costs.18 Membership in a
GPO is voluntary, however independent hospitals are subject to the added
expense of directly contracting for drugs and supplies with individual
manufacturers and distributors.19 However, due to the fiscal efficiencies
that GPOs can offer, GPO use is widespread in the healthcare industry.
The Government Accountability Office ("GAO") has stated that ninety-
eight percent of U.S. hospitals use GPO contracts to purchase products, and
about seventy-three percent of purchases made by hospitals are done
through GPO contracts. 2 0  The field for national GPOs is highly
concentrated, with five GPOs commanding ninety percent of the market.2 1
Many of the agreements entered into between GPOs and pharmaceutical
manufacturers amount to exclusionary agreements, either explicitly through
contractual arrangements, or implicitly through arrangements between the
manufacturers produce the bulk of generic drugs and that, of those, it is rare for more
than three to produce any given drug).
16. See S. PRAKASH SETHI, INT'L CTR. FOR CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, ICCA-
2006.G-01, GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS: AN EVALUATION OF THEIR
EFFECTIVENESS IN PROVIDING SERVICES TO HOSPITALS AND THEIR PATIENTS 6, 17
(2006), available at http://www.icca-corporateaccountability.org/PDFs/HGPIIReport
07-20-06.pdf (stating that GPOs are a form of buying cooperative designed to combine
purchasing power to form leverage to secure lower prices from sellers).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(C) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(j) (2013).
18. See ROBERT E. LITAN & HAL J. SINGER, Do GROUP PURCHASING
ORGANIZATIONS ACHIEVE THE BEST PRICES FOR MEMBER HOSPITALS? AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF AFTERMARKET TRANSACTIONS 2 (Oct. 2010), available at
http://www.medicaldevices.org/sites/default/files/GPO-pricing_1itan-singer-distributio
n_oct%202010.pdf.
19. See Julie C. Klish, Serving Economic Efficiencies or Anticompetitive Purposes:
The Future of Group Purchasing Organizations and the Antitrust Safety Zone, 2 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 173, 175 (2005).
20. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-10-738, GROUP PURCHASING
ORGANIZATIONS: SERVICES PROVIDED TO CUSTOMERS AND INITIATIVES REGARDING
THEIR BUSINESS PRACTICES 4 (2010) [hereinafter GAO-10-738], available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/308830.pdf.
21. HHS ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 5.
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GPO and member hospitals.22 These exclusionary contracting practices
can be complicated, and often involve bundling arrangements, extended
terms, and exclusivity provisions. Product bundling occurs when GPOs
group together multiple drugs and/or medical devices and offer the package
to member hospitals at a discount.23 In addition to bundling, GPOs
typically award long-term contracts to drug and medical device
manufacturers. 24  These long-term agreements commit the GPO to
purchasing the manufacturer's products and improve efficiency by
reducing the need to renegotiate contracts.25 Furthermore, GPOs
frequently use exclusionary sole-source contracts. A sole-source contract
requires that only one person or company provide the goods or services
requested in the contract.26 In general, member hospitals.are not compelled
by GPOs to purchase specific drugs or medical devices through GPO
contracts; however, they must do so if they wish to obtain the discounts
offered by their GPO.27
C. Regulations by Federal Antitrust Authorities Concerning GPOs
In 1993, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") and Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") first issued a joint guidance document
explaining the agencies' views regarding joint purchasing arrangements in
healthcare, last revised in 1996.28 The joint guidance document concluded
22. Cf EINER ELHAUGE, THE EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION FOR HOSPITAL SALES
THROUGH GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2002) [hereinafter EXCLUSION OF
COMPETITION], available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/gpo-rep
ortjune_02.pdf (arguing that many contracts GPOs enter into with medical device
manufacturers amount to exclusionary agreements).
23. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-998T, GROUP PURCHASING
ORGANIZATIONS: USE OF CONTRACTING PROCESSES AND STRATEGIES TO AWARD
CONTRACTS FOR MEDICAL-SURGICAL PRODUCTS 6 (2003) [hereinafter GAO-03-998T],
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/82028.pdf (explaining that bundling links
price discounts to specified groups of products, and discussing several types of
bundling arrangements GPOs frequently engage in).
24. See id. at 14 (declaring that a study found that the two largest GPOs typically
award with longer terms than the next five largest GPOs).
25. See id. (discussing motivation for GPO contract term length).
26. See GAO-10-738, supra note 20, at 2 (in which a letter from Sen. Chuck
Grassley defines sole sourcing as "contracting with only one vendor for a given product
when multiple vendors of comparable products are available").
27. See EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that member
hospitals are free to accept or reject exclusionary contracts on a contract-by-contract
basis).
28. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM., STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTHCARE 1, 1-7 (1996) [hereinafter JOINT GUIDANCE
DOCUMENT], available at http:// www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.pdf (providing a history of
the Joint Guidance Document).
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that most GPO arrangements do not raise antitrust concerns, and that any
antitrust concerns raised by such arrangements are typically outweighed by
efficiencies that will benefit consumers.2 9
The joint guidance document primarily applies to the anticompetitive
effects of GPOs on downstream market participants, such as hospitals and
medical patients. 3 0 The joint guidance document suggests a low risk of
downstream anticompetitive effects, finding few entry barriers to the
formation of GPOs, and that hospitals are a low risk for collusive action
due to the ease with which member hospitals may terminate their contract
with GPOs. 31 As a result of these presumed protections, the joint guidance
document states that the FTC and DOJ will not challenge GPOs absent
"extraordinary circumstances," provided that GPO arrangements with
health care providers meet a two-part test. 32
The first condition of the two-part test provides that "the purchases [of a
particular drug by a GPO] account for less than thirty-five percent of the
total sales of the purchased product or service in the relevant market."3 3
This effectively creates a monopsony safe harbor that is based on a market
share threshold, with the idea that below the thirty-five percent threshold it
is difficult for a GPO to depress prices below a competitive level.34
The second condition of the two-part test requires that "the cost of all the
products and services purchased jointly [under GPO contract] accounts for
less than twenty percent of the total revenues from all products or services
sold by each of the competing participants in the joint purchasing
arrangement."30 This means that the total cost of all GPO purchases made
by any member hospital cannot exceed twenty percent of that hospital's
total profits.36 This condition applies only where some or all of the GPO's
member hospitals are direct competitors, and is intended solely to prevent
collusive arrangements among GPO member hospitals. 37 As a result, the
29. See id. at 53 ("Such collaborative activities typically allow the participants to
achieve efficiencies that will benefit consumers.").
30. See id. at 53-60.
31. See id. at 58 (stating that entry barriers for GPOs are not high).
32. See id. at 54 ("[the agencies] will not challenge, absent extraordinary
circumstances, any joint purchasing arrangement among healthcare providers where
two conditions are present . .
33. Id. at 54-55.
34. See Moss, supra note 14, at 8 (noting that the first test requirement of the joint
guidance document effectively creates a monopsony safe harbor).
35. JoINT GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 28, at 55.
36. See Klish, supra note 19, at 178 (explaining that the aggregate purchases of
GPO member hospitals cannot exceed 20% of the total profits made from all goods and
services sold by each competing member).
37. See JOINT GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 28, at 55-56 (indicating that even
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second condition creates a collusion safe harbor for contracts that do not
raise concerns regarding price fixing among member hospitals.38
Despite the good intentions of the joint guidance document, it is in many
ways woefully inadequate. Most importantly, the joint guidance document
does not provide any guidance on enforcing exclusionary agreements
between GPOs and suppliers. 3 9  Although the joint guidance document
provides a list of mitigating factors for arrangements that fall outside the
safe harbor, if an arrangement falls inside the safe harbor, the federal
agencies cease to consider any possible anticompetitive effects of the
arrangement. 4 0 Therefore, the agency safe harbor shields GPOs engaged in
anticompetitive practices, so long as they meet the minimal requirements of
the two-part test.
The joint guidance document is also alarmingly dated. Conditions today
are vastly different than they were in 1996.41 Market consolidation has
lead to an oligopoly market structure for national GPOs, suggesting that
entry barriers are no longer low. 42 Additionally, the prevalence of bundling
and exclusivity contracts has placed disproportionate power in the hands of
large GPOs, preventing smaller GPOs from offering comparable packages
to hospitals. 43 This not only raises entry barriers, but also creates a market
that naturally trends towards consolidation.
where member hospitals are direct competitors, common GPO membership is not
likely to facilitate collusive price-setting so long as the goods and services purchased
account for only a small percentage of the total hospital profits).
38. See Moss, supra note 14, at 8 (arguing that the second requirement effectively
creates a collusion safe harbor).
39. EINER ELHAUGE, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF GPO EXCLUSIONARY AGREEMENTS
1 (Sept. 26, 2003), available at http://ftc.gov/os/comments/healthcarecomments2/elhau
ge.pdf.
40. See Klish, supra note 19, at 178 (noting that any GPO arrangements that fall
within the antitrust safety zone are exempt from antitrust enforcement except in
extraordinary circumstances).
41. See MOSS, supra note 14, at 8 (arguing that the healthcare intermediaries
market currently has high entry barriers and operates as an oligopoly market, resulting
in an environment in which it is more difficult for hospitals to compete without being a
part of a major GPO).
42. See id. (declaring that GPO entry barriers have risen since 1996); HHS
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 5 (stating that five GPOs command 85-90% of
the market).
43. Cf EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION, supra note 22, at 4 (stating that exclusive
dealing arrangements cause anticompetitive harm by denying rivals the economies of
scale that they need to compete effectively).
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D. GPOs are Protected from Prosecution Under the Federal Anti-
Kickback Statute Through an Easily Attainable Safe Harbor
Purportedly, when a GPO seeks to carry a particular class of product, it
attempts to secure the highest quality and lowest prices possible through a
competitive bidding or auction process that allows vendors to bid for a
contract to supply the GPO's entire network of member hospitals.4 To
cover operating expenses, GPOs are not paid a fee by hospitals; rather, they
charge vendors "administrative" and other fees in exchange for providing
contracting services to hospitals. 45  Under the Federal Anti-Kickback
Statute of the Social Security Act ("Federal Anti-Kickback Statute"), it is
illegal for anyone to receive payment from a party in exchange for
contracting to order a good for the party if the good is in any way paid for
through a federal healthcare program (e.g., Medicare).46 However, in the
late 1980s, GPO interest groups convinced Congress that by charging
administrative fees to manufacturers rather than to medical providers,
GPOs would achieve greater efficiencies, which would result in lower
federal healthcare expenditures. 7 Congress, therefore, amended the Social
Security Act in 1987, exempting GPOs from the statutory ban on
kickbacks.4 8
In 1991, HHS formally established a GPO anti-kickback provision "safe
harbor," (hereinafter "GPO Safe Harbor") which promulgated the specific
requirements that GPOs must meet to be exempted from prosecution for
fraud under the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute. 4 9 To meet the GPO Safe
44. See LITAN & SINGER, supra note 18, at 2 (explaining that GPOs contract to
supply the entirety of their member hospital networks through a bidding or auction
process).
45. See id. (noting that GPOs cover operating expenses by charging vendors
"administrative" fees based on a percentage of the proceeds generated by the auction,
as well as through other fees); Daniel DeLay, Watch out for GPOs, FORBES (Nov. 12,
2009, 4:23 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/12/gpo-medicare-hospitals-medical-
health-opinions-contributors-daniel-delay.html (explaining and critiquing the
administrative fee system, which GPOs use instead of charging fees to hospitals).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012).
47. See Patricia Earl & Phillip L. Zweig, Connecting the Dots: How
Anticompetitive Contracting Practices, Kickbacks, and Self-dealing by Hospital Group
Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) Cause the U.S. Drug Shortage, CARE AND COST
(Feb. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Connecting the Dots], http://careandcost.com/2012/02/14/
connecting-the-dots-how-anticompetitive-contracting-practices-kickbacks-and-self-
dealing-by-hospital-group-purchasing-organizations-gpos-caused-the-u-s-drug-
shortage/ (stating that in 1987, GPO interest groups successfully lobbied Congress to
allow them to charge administrative fees to vendors, arguing that this would be more
cost efficient for consumers).
48. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.9520) (2013); S. REP. No. 100-109, at 27 (1987).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (providing a detailed overview of the specific
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Harbor, GPOs must meet the following requirements: (1) they must have a
written agreement with each entity to which they provide services, (2) the
agreement must be signed by both parties, and (3) the agreement must state
either that administrative fees from vendors are capped at three percent or
less of the purchase price, or the agreement must specify a fixed amount or
percentage of the value of purchases each vendor will pay.50 In other
words, administrative fees are capped at three percent of total purchase
value unless the contract explicitly provides any other amount or
percentage.51
In most cases, a GPO's member hospitals actually own the GPO.52 At
the end of each fiscal year, GPOs redistribute a portion of their profits to
their member hospitals in the form of patronage or corporate dividends.53
In theory, this system encourages GPOs to secure the best possible deals
for hospitals, since they are entering into those deals for themselves.54
However, because administrative fees are a percentage of the price of total
sales volume, it is not always in the best interest of GPOs to negotiate the
lowest possible price with manufacturers.55 This problem is compounded
by the fact that member hospitals frequently do not have any incentive to
pressure GPOs for lower negotiated prices, as a percentage of the
supracompetitive profits are returned to hospitals in the form of
dividends.56 The end result is that, although hospitals and GPOs both
requirements set forth by the HHS necessary to meet the safe-harbor requirements, as
well as their rationale).
50. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(j).
51. See GAO-10-738, supra note 20, at 11 (observing that, as reported by the
GPOs, the average contract administrative fees weighted by purchasing volume ranged
from 1.22 percent of purchases to 2.25 percent of purchases). But see GAO-03-998T,
supra note 23, at 2 (noting that the administrative fees can be much higher, in one case
reaching nearly 18 percent).
52. DeLay, supra note 45 (stating that most member hospitals are owners of their
respective GPOs, acting akin to shareholders); see also EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION,
supra note 22, at 41 (explaining that a portion of GPO revenue gets redistributed to
shareholder hospitals).
53. Cf HERBERT HOVENKAMP, HEALTH INDUS. GRP. PURCHASING Ass'N,
COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF GROUP PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS' (GPO) PURCHASING
AND PRODUCT SELECTION PRACTICES IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 4 (Apr. 2002)
(discussing shareholder hospitals and GPO profit redistribution); see also DeLay, supra
note 45 (declaring that GPOs return a portion of excess fees to shareholder hospitals in
the form of dividends).
54. See id.
55. See LITAN & SINGER, supra note 18, at 4 (arguing that if a GPO is receiving
kickbacks equal to a percentage of the auction proceeds, the GPO lacks a strong
incentive to seek out the lowest price; furthermore, administrative fees impose a cost on
medical product vendors, causing them to bid less aggressively on price so that they
have excess resources to afford the large side payment).
56. See EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION, supra note 22, at 26 (discussing the
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benefit from the administrative fee system, medical patients-the intended
beneficiaries of the administrative fee system-do not receive any
efficiencies.
II. GPOs AND ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR: A FAILURE OF FEDERAL
REGULATION
Antitrust law traditionally bans a number of arrangements and practices
considered anticompetitive. This section examines how federal policies
and practices have allowed GPOs to engage in behaviors, which would
otherwise be deemed anticompetitive, and examines what specific
anticompetitive behaviors GPOs engage in. Part 111(A) is divided into three
sections, which analyze: (i) GPO exclusionary contracting practices, (ii)
GPO bundling and tying arrangements, and (iii) market concentration and
pricing issues. Part III(B) argues .that .the safe-harbor provision of the
Federal Anti-Kickback statute has been subverted from its original purpose,
and now effectively permits otherwise fraudulent kickbacks.
A. GPO Contracting Practices Led to Increased Market Consolidation
Current federal antitrust policies have allowed for, and in some cases
promoted, GPO action that would constitute antitrust violations in different
circumstances. This section analyzes the market structure and contracting
practices of GPOs in relation to traditional federal antitrust regulations.
i. GPOs Utilize Sole-Source Contracts and Rebate Penalties to
Restrict Member Hospitals From Purchasing From Independent
Third Parties
Under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, it is an antitrust violation for a
company to make a contract "where the effect of such . .. contract for
sale . . . may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce."5  Subsequent case law has interpreted
this to mean that vertical non-price restraints, including exclusionary
contracts, are subject to a rule of reason analysiS. 59
incentives member hospitals have to gain through compliance with the side-payment
system).
57. See id. at 41 (stating that member hospitals benefit from both side-payment
schemes, such as dividends to shareholder hospitals, and special discounts; both of
which align the interest of member hospitals with GPOs, but which pass down
additional costs to nonmember hospitals, patients, insurers, and government payors).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2012).
59. See Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977) (declaring
that the rule of reason applied to all vertical non-price restraints, and that per-se
illegality was the exception). A "rule of reason" analysis, as first developed in
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), provides that in certain situations
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A contract may be legally analyzed as an exclusive dealing arrangement
even if the agreement is not literally exclusive. 60  Few GPO contracts
explicitly impose a restriction on their member hospitals that they may
never deal with competitors.6 ' An example of the typical requirements
imposed upon GPO members may be seen in Premier's 2008 group
purchasing policy, which incorporates a "market penetration target" of fifty
percent of total supply purchasing for member hospitals, with penalties
imposed on those who fail to meet the target.62 While a requirements
contract of ninety-five percent would likely be held to be anticompetitive, a
requirement of only fifty percent is unlikely to raise any serious
63exclusionary concerns in court. However, membership contracts are not
the primary means by which GPOs engage in exclusive dealing.
The majority of exclusionary contracts entered into by GPOs are not
mandatory arrangements.64 Rather, the GPO member hospitals are given
the option to opt into exclusionary agreements on a contract-by-contract
basis.6' These voluntary contracts offer significant incentives to hospitals,
but at a high cost-they are frequently bundled to cover multiple products
and manufacturers, they may impose retroactive fiscal penalties for
deviation, and may even ban the purchase of specific rival products.66
only business practices or contracts that unreasonably restrain trade shall be considered
violations of Section I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012), which allows for the
circumstances of business practices to be considered in assessing their legality for
antitrust purposes.
60. See id. (noting that certain contracts may, as a practical matter, exclude rivals
without containing an express prohibition against dealing with rivals; and that such
contracts may be analyzed as exclusive dealing contracts despite not being literally
exclusive).
61. See EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION, supra note 22, at 4 (declaring that many
agreements GPOs enter into between both vendors and member hospitals qualify as
exclusive agreements, even though many do not expressly prohibit dealing with all
competitors in all instances).
62. See PREMIER, PREMIER GROUP PURCHASING POLICY (Jan. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.alliant-has.com/sites/default/files/PremierPurchasingPolicy.pdf ("If a
member's participation falls below 50%, adjustments to the member's fiscal year
Supply Chain Improvement Plan will be developed to move participation to 50% or
above.").
63. See ZF Meritor LLC v. Eaton Corp., 769 F. Supp. 2d 684 (D. Del. 2011)
(enjoining use of market penetration ranges); Moss, supra note 14, at 10-11 (observing
that market penetration ranges have been successfully challenged in court).
64. See EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION, supra note 22, at 3 (explaining that, although
GPOs offer numerous exclusionary contracting arrangements, the majority of these
arrangements do not mandate member hospital participation).
65. See id. (remarking that member hospitals are typically free to accept or reject
the vast majority of exclusionary contracts offered to them by GPOs).
66. See id. at 3-4 (explaining the trade-off between the positive incentives GPO
exclusionary agreements provide to hospitals, and the high costs they often impose:
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Hospitals enter voluntary exclusionary agreements with GPOs for a wide
variety of compelling reasons. The most common reason that a member
hospital enters into a voluntary commitment contract through its GPO is
that the GPO is capable of offering the hospital a supracompetitive price on
the product through its monopsony buying power.67 However, the
incentives GPOs offer to hospitals through discounted goods only
sometimes take the form of an outright cut to sale price. In some cases,
hospitals find that the standardization resulting from sole-source or dual-
source contracts is an efficiency benefit in of itself.68 One common tactic
GPOs employ in exclusionary contracts is the use of loyalty discounts or
rebate programs. In contracts employing a loyalty rebate, a member
hospital is eligible for a rebate upon purchasing a high percentage share of
specified GPO products. 70 These loyalty rebates typically last five to seven
years, and may include a retroactive enforcement clause. 7'
The penalties GPOs assign for breach of voluntary contracts may, in
some cases, exceed the penalties assigned for breach of a mandatory
contract. 72 A failure to meet an explicit (mandatory) commitment contract
can result in fines or penalties; however, these penalties are subject to
antitrust scrutiny.n Under voluntary contracts, a GPO often does not issue
fines-they instead withdraw rebate or discount offers. A GPO's
withdrawal of a rebate offer has the same effect as an outright fine;
however, by guising the penalty as loss of a rebate, the GPO can avoid
scrutiny under antitrust law.74 In many ways, loyalty rebates can be more
binding hospitals to the mandated product despite the possible availability of better
and/or cheaper products elsewhere).
67. See id. at 39 (contending that GPOs have the capacity to exercise monopsony
power to demand supracompetitive rates on many items, and that the ability to exert
such power is itself anticompetitive).
68. See id. at 5 (observing that various interested parties exert pressure on hospitals
to encourage the use of standardized devices, and that standardization internally within
a hospital often leads to efficiency benefits).
69. See id. at 7 (arguing that loyalty rebates are utilized by GPOs to impose
penalties on noncompliant hospitals).
70. See id. at 8 (explaining that rebates or discounts are conditioned on purchasing
a high share of the buyer's purchases from the supplier, as opposed to a standard
discount, which would be a per item price cut).
71. See id. at 8-9 (disclosing that a retroactive enforcement clause means that if the
hospital deviates from its agreement and purchases a lower share than required to meet
the rebate, it has to refund the GPO the total amount of all prior rebates received).
72. See id. at 7-9 (noting that conditioned rebates have the potential to impose
much harsher penalties for noncompliance than a traditional contract).
73. See id. at 7 (stating that GPOs may assign contractual penalties to purchasing
arrangements for breach by a buyer, but that any such penalties may not unreasonably
restrain trade).
74. See id. at 7 (stating that the termination penalty imposed on buyers that do not
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exclusionary than an explicit sole-source contract.7 This is primarily due
to retroactive enforcement clauses, which can result in a higher financial
penalty for a hospital breach of the agreement than would be otherwise
allowed under the law for breach of contract.76
Both sole-source contracts and loyalty rebate contracts are designed to
exclude rivals from the relevant market. Each form of contract is designed
to secure the GPO the highest possible market share for the product in
question, leaving rivals with a share that is not large enough to support
economies of scale.n This raises entry barriers for manufacturers and
concentrates the supply chain.
Although exclusive arrangements between hospitals and GPOs can have
notable anticompetitive effects, the most significant antitrust concern
regarding exclusive dealing arrangements arises from contracts with sellers,
particularly generic manufacturers who sell to GPOs.78 These companies
operate on razor-thin margins, and, due to economies of scale, acquiring a
GPO contract is integral in determining whether the manufacturer can
make a profit.7 9 Upriver exclusive dealing arrangements significantly raise
entry barriers for small manufacturers attempting to enter the generic drug
market, and create a risk that large manufacturers and GPOs will enter into
collusive arrangements designed to keep small generic manufacturers out
of the market.80
comply with rebate programs is serious enough to make exclusive dealing agreements
raise antitrust concerns); see also Moss, supra note 14, at 11 (stating that "a lost rebate
or discount is, in effect, damages for breach of contract," and in many cases may far
exceed the damages for an actual breach of contract).
75. . See EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION, supra note 22, at 11 (arguing that the fact that
payments given for loyalty commitments are often not proportional to volume actually
worsens the anti-competitive effect of such agreements by creating a more effective
means of dividing monopoly profits created by seller-buyer collusion designed to
enhance seller market power).
76. See id.
77. See id. at 14, 17 (declaring that, even in cases where a new entrant can enter the
market, if the innovators who succeed cannot access a large share of the product market
and gain economies of scale, then capital markets will provide less funding for
innovation than they otherwise would).
78. See Hospital Group Purchasing: Lowering Costs at the Expense of Patient
Health and Medical Innovation?: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Antitrust, Bus. Rights,
& Competition of S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 68 (2002) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg85986/pdf/
CHRG-107shrg85986.pdf ("'[S]ole source' contracts... create strong disincentives
for hospitals to purchase competing products, effectively shutting smaller competitors
out of the market.").
79. See id. (statement of Sen. Herbert Kohl, Subcomm. Chairman) ("Gaining a
GPO contract is essential for any [pharmaceutical or] medical equipment supplier.").
80. See EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION, supra note 22, at 4, 30 (stating that exclusive
dealing arrangements raise rivals' costs by denying those competitors economies of
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ii. GPOs Utilize Bundling Arrangements to Expand Market Share
and Exclude Potential Competition
GPOs often offer discounts that are conditioned on a hospital buying
multiple products together.8 ' Federal antitrust enforcement authorities
have adopted policies that allow GPOs to engage in both upriver and
downriver bundling and tying agreements.82
"Tying" and "bundling" are not always easily defined. In theory, tying
simply describes an arrangement where a supplier conditions the sale of
one product on the purchaser's agreement to purchase another (often
complementary) product.83 Bundling is like tying, with the caveat that the
customer is not actually required to buy a second product, but must do so to
qualify for a discount on the first product. 84 Despite this difference, in
practice, bundled discounts can produce many of the same anticompetitive
effects as tying. 85
To secure a contract with a GPO, many large manufacturers are
encouraged to bundle various product lines together, with one product
acting as a loss leader.86 Most GPOs use some form of bundling, and the
two top national GPOs do a majority of their business through bundled
buying and selling. 87 The prevalence of manufacturer bundling deals
provides a significant advantage to incumbent suppliers and raises entry
barriers for smaller manufacturers with fewer products.88  Smaller
scale, and that powerful buyers have incentives to agree to terms that enhance seller
market power in instances where the seller can share supracompetitive profits).
81. See LITAN & SINGER, supra note 18, at 35 (noting that GPOs frequently offer
discounts that are conditioned on bundling).
82. For the purpose of economic analysis, "upriver" means companies upstream in
the supply chain, and "downriver" means companies downstream in the supply chain.
83. See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REv. 397, 399-400 (2009) (defining and
discussing tying in light of the Chicago school of economics).
84. See id. ("Bundled discounts can produce the same anticompetitive effects as
tying without substantial tied foreclosure, but only when the unbundled price exceeds
the but-for price.").
85. See id. ("[W]hen the unbundled price exceeds the but-for price, bundled
discounts should be condemned based on market power absent offsetting efficiencies,
with the same exception for products with a fixed ratio that lack separate utility. When
the unbundled price does not exceed the but-for price or this exception applies, bundled
discounts should be condemned only when a substantial foreclosure share or effect
exists.").
86. See Connecting the Dots, supra note 47, at 9 ("To win a contract, a
manufacturer would often use a drug as a loss leader, bundling it with other generics in
its product line.").
87. See GAO-03-998T, supra note 23, at 11 (noting that the two largest national
GPOs used bundling agreements to conduct a majority of their business).
88. See Moss, supra note 14, at 13-14 (stating that the effect of losing bundled
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manufacturers, if they produce more than one product, may lack the variety
of product line to create a compelling bundle and compete for GPO
contracts. Additionally, smaller manufacturers who are able to offer a
bundled deal may lack the resources to compete with one of their products
sold as a loss leader. 89 The lack of any antitrust protection against bundling
poses real problems for medical supply chains in particular, as bundling
arrangements that exclude rivals can increase the cost of medication,
reduce choice, and discourage entry and innovation-all factors that
contribute to the drug shortage crisis. 90
iii. GPOs are Currently Operating as Oligopolies Which Leads to
Many of the Same Anticompetitive Concerns as Monopolization
Currently, six GPOs dominate the national market for acute care medical
supplies, controlling over ninety percent of sales. 9' Within the GPO
industry, the three largest firms-MedAssets, Novation, and Premier-
dominate industry earnings, controlling approximately seventy-five percent
of total industry revenue in 2012.92
GPO sole-source contracts and near-mandatory bundling packages have
resulted in upstream market consolidation by raising entry barriers and
concentrating market share in the hands of large manufacturers who are
able to secure GPO contracts.93 Monopolies or oligopolies on multiple
tiers of a single supply chain have the potential to be particularly
anticompetitive.94 When both an intermediary and its supplier have
discounts is so significant that smaller competitors attempting to enter the market
would, in some instances, have to actually pay the buyer to purchase their product(s) to
fully compensate the buyer for the loss of the bundled discount).
89. Cf id. at 14 (observing that competition in a market that primarily deals in
bundles inherently disadvantages the smaller competitor and single-product new
entrants, who are unable to offer comparable discounts).
90. See id. at 6 (noting that the exclusionary effects of bundled discounts lead to
fewer market entrants and a more fragile supply chain, resulting in limited choices in
drugs and medical devices, depriving consumers of innovation and product diversity).
91. See The Effect of Regulatory Neglect on Health Care Consumers: Hearing on
Competition in the Health Care Marketplace Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot.,
Prod. Safety and Ins. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 111th Cong. 2
(2009) (statement of David Balto, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress Action
Fund), available at http://www.pbmwatch.com/uploads/8/2/7/8/8278205/balto.senateco
mmerce09.testimony.pdf.
92. See GPO Facts and Figures, HEALTHCARE PURCHASING NEWs (Oct. 2012),
http://www.hpnonline.com/resources/GPOs.html.
93. See LITAN & SINGER, supra note 18, at 39 (arguing that there is significant
economic literature supporting the proposition that bundling and exclusive contracting
agreements result in anticompetitive harm by raising entry barriers).
94. See Moss, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that healthcare intermediaries can
influence market outcomes not only at the level in which they compete, but also in
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monopoly power, traditional competition is replaced by bargaining. 95
These arrangements are not only at high risk for vertical collusion, they
also raise entry barriers by promoting exclusion of smaller rivals in the
supply chain. 96
B. A Rose by any Other Name: Administrative Fees and the Side-
Payments as Kickbacks
The most problematic anticompetitive behaviors leading to decreased
market competition and drug shortages are kickbacks paid by
manufacturers to GPOs in exchange for exclusive contracts. At first glance
it may seem odd for GPOs to engage in practices like sole-sourcing, which
increase manufacturer market power (by consolidating the manufacturing
market), as this can result in manufacturers being able to charge higher
prices; however, GPOs are actually rewarded for such practices because
manufacturers share their supracompetitive profits through side-
payments.97  GPOs benefit when the manufacturer pays a higher
administrative fee, and the increased price for the monopolized good is
simply passed on to the buyer's customers in the form of increased
marginal cost.98 Since hospitals also receive a cut of the side-payments
through dividends, the only loser in this scenario is the consumer of the
good-the medical patient. The following section examines these side-
payments, or "kickbacks," in greater detail.
i. The Administrative Fee System is Not Only a Kickback, It
Actually Raises Drug and Medical Device Costs
The Federal Anti-Kickback statute was originally enacted in 1972, and
provides both civil and criminal penalties for offering or paying any
remuneration to induce someone to purchase, lease, or order any item or
service for which payment may be made under a federal healthcare
complimentary markets, and arguing that GPOs have significant influence).
95. See id. (declaring that when multilateral monopoly or oligopoly characterizes
the relationship between an intermediary and upstream seller, bargaining displaces
traditional market forces).
96. See id. (claiming that small upstream vendors are particularly at risk from GPO
control over complimentary markets).
97. See ExcLusION OF COMPETITION, supra note 22, at 29 (providing an analysis of
why buyers might agree to an arrangement that enhances seller market power,
suggesting that one such method is for intermediaries to pass along the increased
profits to the buyers through various mechanisms).
98. See id. (stating that because such cost increases are passed onto consumers, the
participating buyer's only actual losses are from reduced sales, the cost of which is
effectively offset by side-payments from the seller's monopoly overcharge).
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program. 99 Initially, the administrative fee system under which GPOs
currently operate violated the Federal Anti-Kickback statute. 00 However,
in 1987, the GPO Safe Harbor was passed under the belief that GPOs could
operate more efficiently if they were able to charge administrative fees to
manufacturers rather than rely solely on the participation fees of
hospitals.'io The GPO Safe Harbor has permitted GPOs to require
significant payments from manufacturers in exchange for awarding
contracts. Because GPO contracts are often exclusionary, administrative
fees effectively act as payments by manufacturers to exclude
competitors.102
Under the Safe Harbor provision, administrative fees theoretically have a
soft cap at three percent of sales.10 3 Anything above this limit requires that
the GPO annually disclose the percentage of administrative fees to the
Secretary of HHS.104 However, GPOs have managed to avoid the reporting
requirements by inventing new fees or accepting payments which together
frequently may amount to twenty percent or more of the total sales price.' 05
In one instance, the fees reportedly reached ninety-four percent of total
sales volume.106 The sheer scale of the kickbacks required from many
GPOs is problematic, as smaller manufacturers may not have the capital or
manufacturing capacity necessary to meet GPO demands.10 7
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012).
100. See CYNTHIA Y. REISZ & CATHERINE J.B. SLOAN, 2006 HEALTH L. HANDBOOK
§ 12:3 (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2006) (arguing that prior to 1987, the administrative fees
system under which GPOs currently operate would have constituted fraud).
101. See Hospital Group Purchasing: Lowering Costs at the Expense of Patient
Health and Medical Innovation?: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Antitrust, Bus. Rights,
& Competition of S. Comm. of the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of Sen.
Mike DeWine), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
107shrg85986/pdf/CHRG-107shrg85986.pdf ("GPOs in some cases have strayed from
their original purpose of allowing hospitals to work together to limit costs."); REIsZ &
SLOAN, supra note 100, § 12:3.
102. See generally Connecting the Dots, supra note 47 (providing a critique of the
administrative fees system, with a particular focus on the exclusionary effect on
innovative manufacturers).
103. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(j) (2013).
104. Id.
105. See Connecting the Dots, supra note 47, at 5 (noting that GPOs frequently
accept additional payments such as up-front payments, signing bonuses, prebates, and
rebates in addition to the contracted administrative fees).
106. See Mariah Blake, Dirty Medicine, Washington Monthly (July/Aug. 2010),
available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1007.blake.html
(stating that the total annual fees one manufacturer paid to a major GPO amounted to
ninety-four percent of the total sales volume).
107. Cf United States ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Novation, L.L.C., No. 3:03-CV-1589-N,
2008 WL 9334966, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2008) (asserting that GPOs engaged in
anticompetitive practices which purposefully excluded smaller competition).
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Offering a large side-payment is one way that dominant manufacturers
may secure a sole-source contract from a GPO, thereby excluding rivals
that may offer a better quality product or more competitive price.'0o The
incentive GPOs have to acquire large kickbacks and the incentive
manufacturers have to acquire market power have led to instances of GPOs
auctioning off exclusive contracts to manufacturers in exchange for large
kickbacks.' 09
In addition to having exclusionary effects, side-payments may raise the
costs of drugs and medical supplies. Because GPO revenue is derived from
kickbacks, and is largely based on a percentage of vendor sales volume,
higher product prices mean more money for GPOs." 0 The additional cost
is then passed on to buyers downstream."' One may expect that hospitals
would not agree to a side-payment system that creates upstream market
consolidation and raises prices, however, because most member hospitals
are GPO shareholders and receive dividends, the hospitals also benefit from
the side-payment system. 112
There is considerable evidence that GPOs do not actually lower drug and
medical device prices when compared to a market able to operate freely." 3
A 2002 GAO report found that in some instances, hospitals may pay up to
thirty-nine percent more for goods purchased through GPOs than if they
had negotiated the purchase of those same goods directly with the
manufacturer.114 A 2010 independent analysis of the subject found that
hospitals could save an average of fifteen percent on the cost of drugs and
medical supplies by bidding outside of GPO contracts."' These studies are
108. See EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION, supra note 22, at 39-31 (declaring that GPO
exclusionary agreements are likely to be particularly attractive to incumbent device
manufacturers who face or fear entry by innovative new products).
109. Cf Novation, L.L.C., 2008 WL 9334966, at *2-3 (in which Novation was sued
for allegedly auctioning off exclusive contracts in exchange for kickbacks).
110. See EXCLUSION OF COMPETITION, supra note 22, at 30 (noting that GPOs are
not incentivized to drive down prices for consumers).
111. See id. (explaining how the side-payment system ultimately raises costs for
consumers).
112. See id. (discussing hospital participation in the side-payment system).
113. See generally Pilot Study Suggests Buying Groups Do Not Always Offer
Hospitals Lower Prices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition, and
Bus. and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002)
(statement of William J. Scanlon, Director, Health Care Issues) (stating that by
eliminating competition and extracting fees of indeterminable amounts from
manufacturers, GPOs inflate the cost of drugs beyond what it would be if the market
were able to operate freely).
114. See id. at 3 (declaring that, for some product models, hospitals using GPO
contracts got prices up to 39 percent higher than hospitals not using GPO contracts).
115. See LITAN & SINGER, supra note 18 (noting that an independent study
determined that GPOs charge in excess of 15% compared to a free market); Connecting
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a major critique of the administrative fee system, as they show that the
effect of GPOs directly contradicts their intended purpose.
III. THE NECESSARY PARADIGM SHIFT: How THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
SHOULD REGULATE GPOs
Anticompetitive effects associated with GPO contracting practices can
work against achieving important public policy goals in healthcare, such as
ensuring drug availability and affordable healthcare costs. Eliminating
GPOs entirely is unnecessary-GPOs have the potential to act as efficient
intermediaries to lower costs without causing any anticompetitive effects.
Rather, the solution is to eliminate the anticompetitive business practices of
GPOs. Achieving this goal will require both the executive and legislative
branches to take action.
A. Executives Agencies Should Impose Traditional Antitrust Scrutiny on
GPOs
Federal antitrust engagement authorities need to reassess their position
regarding GPOs, and more vigorously enforce antitrust laws in the
healthcare market. This can be achieved through several steps. First, the
1996 joint guidance statement issued by the FTC and DOJ should be
revised so that antitrust concerns in healthcare are treated more consistently
with general antitrust analysis. There should not be an automatic
assumption of procompetitive effects for GPOs. Second, the FTC and DOJ
should perform a new analysis of market concentration and barriers to entry
on all levels of the medical supply chain. The areas of the market that pose
the greatest competitive problems, such as GPOs, should face heightened
scrutiny and lower barriers for antitrust enforcement actions. Given the
need for significant reform in the market, the FTC and DOJ should set up a
temporary new division to protect competition in the healthcare supply
chain, which should exist for a period of approximately ten years, long
enough to establish a new corporate culture for GPOs.
B. Congress Should Revoke the GPO Safe Harbor from the Federal Anti-
Kickback Statute
Perhaps the most important reform necessary for halting GPO
anticompetitive practices is for Congress to take steps to eliminate the
supplier-funded business model for GPOs. To achieve this, Congress
should ban GPOs from having any investment interest or option in
the Dots, supra note 47, at 19 (stating that based upon a study by Navigant Economics,
in a truly free market a vial of propofol (sold in GPO for $.048 per vial, and out of
GPO for $7.60 per vial) would cost hospitals only $0.36).
2014 PAY- TO-PLA Y 247
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAWREVIEW
pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturers. Preventing GPOs from
investing directly in any specific drug or medical device will ensure that
decisions to supply a particular drug or medical device are based on the
merits of that product, not whether the GPO has a fiscal interest in the
success of the product. Further, Congress should provide a general ban on
GPOs taking any payments from manufacturers with whom they contract,
regardless of whether these payments are tied to purchasing volumes.
Although it seems like these policies might be difficult to legislate, the
solution is actually quite simple. The only step necessary to provide a total
ban on GPO side-payments is for Congress to repeal the GPO anti-
kickback safe harbor provision." 6 Without the safe-harbor provision, side-
payments would be considered fraud, and subject to civil and criminal
penalties.
To the extent that any side-payments are permitted, GPOs engaging in
such practices should be required to disclose the full terms and conditions
of any such agreement, as well as the terms and conditions of any alternate
bids to appropriate government agencies, most likely HHS and FTC. Such
agreements should be subject to heightened scrutiny for anticompetitive
effect.
CONCLUSION
GPOs engage in anticompetitive behaviors that damage the
pharmaceutical supply chain and lead to drug shortages. The contracting
practices of GPOs have led to significant market consolidation, not only for
healthcare intermediaries, but also for upstream suppliers. Current GPO
contracting practices would violate antitrust law if not for the safe harbors
granted to GPOs by both federal antitrust enforcement authorities and
Congress. Those safe-harbors have been abused by the GPO industry.
To eliminate anticompetitive action by GPOs, both the executive and
legislative branches must take action and revise their treatment of GPOs.
Federal antitrust agencies should apply traditional antitrust law scrutiny for
GPOs, and Congress should repeal the GPO Safe Harbor. Applying these
recommendations would lead to a stronger and more robust drug and
medical device supply chain, and lower the potential for serious drug
shortages.
116. See Connecting the Dots, supra note 47, at 21 (arguing that the GPO safe
harbor of the Anti-Kickback Statute should be repealed).
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